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[So F. No. 19975. In Bank. Nov. 10, 1959.] 
CAROLYN "R. GARDNER et al., Respondents, v. STATE 
OF CALIFORNIA DIRECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT 
et al., Appellants. 
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Right to Benefits-Trade Disputes. 
-The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board properly de-
nied unemployment insurance benefits to union employees of 
certain restaurants, members of a county restaurant associa-
tion, under Unempl. Ins. Code, § 1262, rendering ineligible for 
unemployment benefits a workman who "left his work because 
of a trade dispute," where, following negotiations on modifica-
tion of a master contract covering all restaurant workers in 
the area, the union representing them voted to strike against 
the entire industry, two weeks later the restaurant association 
voted to adhere to a previously adopted policy that a strike 
against one member would be recognized as a strike against 
all and so notified the union executive board, the executive 
board of the union called a strike against nine or ten restaurant 
members of the association, and the association on the same 
day notified its members to layoff their employees on the fol-
lowing day because of the strike, thus causing the unemploy-
ment for which benefits were sought, since the claimants were 
out of work after the lockout because of their own conduct 
and that of their union. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. John D. Foley, Judge. Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. • 
[1] See Oal . .Tur.2d, Unemployment Insurance, § 22. 
:Melt. Dig. Reference: [1] Unemployment Insurance, § 20. 
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County Restaurant Association or had given such association 
authority to negotiate labor matters for them. There were 
approximately 70 members of the association and 44 author-
izing employers (hereinafter treated as members) in a total 
of 700 to 800 establishments. Lists of the association members 
had been sent to the board under dates of March 11, 1955, and 
April 28, 1955. Association members employed about 50 per 
cent (about 1,600 to 1,800 of the total of approximately 3,500) 
of all the employes in the industry in the county, including 
other help such as supervisorial, clerical, and: office employes. 
Collective bargaining agreements had been negotiated by and 
executed between the board and the association from 1951 
through 1955, during which time the board had recognized the 
association as the bargaining agent for association members 
and the association had likewise recognized the board as bar-
gaining agent for the employes of association members. 
On April 11, 1955, following negotiations, on modification 
of a 1953 master contract,' the unions voted to strike against 
the entire industry, and the board was authorized to determine 
when and against whom to call and implement the authoriR:ed 
strike. This action by the unions marked the inception of a 
trade dispute and was the forerunner of typical collective bar-
gaining maneuvers, collective for all the member employes 
through their Local Joint Executive Board and for all the 
member employers through their county association. It was 
the intent of the union in seeking to secure a more desirable 
master contract to use the strategy of implementing the strike 
against, and picketing, selected association members rather 
than undertaking to walk out of, and picket, all at the same 
time. Two weeks later (April 25) association members voted 
to adhere to the previously adopted policy, that a strike im-
plemented against one would be recogniR:ed as a strike directed 
against all, and on April 28 notified the board of this decision. 
The unions were of course aware that the trade dispute con-
cerned the terms of their master contract, that they had voted 
a strike against, and were seeking a better contract with, all 
association members, and they were specifically notified that a 
strike implemented by them against any association member 
would, or at least could, result in a retaliatory shutdown or 
~ oontraet had eovered the period from July 1, 1953, to April 
80, 1956, and had provided that the anniversa.r;r date would be April 30 
of each :rear and that, on the BeIlOnd anniversary date, it qht be 
opened on the hlsuell of wqes and fringe benefits. 
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lockout by other association members.4 It is clear that at 
this time a trade dispute was in progress but until this time 
no economic weapon had actually been applied by either party. 
But on May 25, 1955, the first blow was struck; the board, 
seeking to enforce its previously announced demands for 
changes in the master contract affecting all employers and all 
employes, called and implemented the authorized strike 
against, and picketed, the establishments of nine or 10 associa-
tion members. On the same day the association, pursuant to 
its previously announced policy, retaliated by notifying its 
members to layoff their employes as of the close of business 
the following day, because of the strike. The evidence con-
flicts as to the effectiveness of the shutdown. There is testi-
mony that the lockout was 70 per cent effective as to total 
number of employes affected, and also that only some 34 or 
35 members (with an unspecified number of establishments) 
had effected complete lockouts. On June 13, 1955, the lock-
out was terminated by the association because it was not com-
plete and had caused dissension among the members. Some 
of the members allegedly signed individual contracts, but 
negotiations between the board and association were continued 
and on June 29, 1955, an agreement was executed by the execu-
tive board and by the association. Such master agreement 
covered the association members who had allegedly signed 
individual contracts as well as the others, and the dispute 
between the unions and the association thereupon terminated. 
[1] Petitioners were union member employes of restaurants 
which closed in response to the association's notice. The Un-
employment Insurance Appeals Board determined that under 
the volitional test rule as enunciated, developed and applied in 
Bodinson Mfg. 00. v. Oalifornia Emp. Oom. (1941), 17 Cal. 
2d 321, 327 [109 P.2d 935] ; Bunny's Waffle Shop v. Oalifornia 
Emp. Oom. (1944), 24 Cal.2d 735, 738, 742 [151 P.2d 224] ; 
McKinley V. Oalifornia. Emp. Stab. Oom. (1949), 34 Cal.2d 
239,244-245 [209 P.2d 602] ; and Ohrysler Oorp. V. Oalifornia 
Emp. Stab. Oom. (1953), 116 Cal.App.2d 8, 15-20 [3-7] [253 
P.2d 68] (see also Barber V. Oalifornia. Emp. Stab. Oant. 
(1954), 130 Cal.App.2d 7, 16-20 [278 P.2d 762]), petitioners 
-Evidence on the following proposition was in considerable con1lict: 
In 1953 despite a similar notice that a strike against one would be eon· 
sidered a strike against all, the board had called a strike against some 
association members, which proceeded for six weeks before the associa-
tion had called for a lockout by nonstruck members_ The strike ended the 
day after the lockout began; the dispute had been settled with a new 
collective bargaining agreement. The number or percentage of nonstruck 
mllIl1bers who had honored the lockout request was not established. 
!:J 
Nov. 1959] GARl>N'ER tI. STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
[53 C.2d 23; 346 P.2d 1931 
27 
had left their work because of a trade dispute and hence, un-
der section 1262 of the Unemployment Insurance Code,! were 
ineligible for benefits. . 
This determination is correct unless we; are to overrule 
the McKinley case and overrule, disapprove or distinguish the 
other cited cases. Here as in McKinley, the unions had voted 
to strike against the entire industry and the executive board 
was authorized (in the language of the appeals board's de-
cision) "to call a strike if and when and .against whom it 
determined to be to the best advantage of the union"; the 
objective sought to be accomplished by the strike was the 
making of certain changes in the master collective bargaining 
agreement, which changes would affect all association members 
and their employes; furthermore, as in McKinley, the unions 
were aware of the policy of the employers, acting through 
their association, that a called strike agamst one would be 
considered a strike against all.~ Obviously here, as in Mc-
Kinley, the unions could foresee that the strategy of im-
plementing the strike against less than all members might re-
sult in termination of the employment of employes of the other 
members, and that their consequent unemployment would, 
under the currently established rule, be reg~rded as voluntary 
and thus a bar to benefits. As in Thomas v. California Emp. 
Stab. Com. (1952), 39 Cal.2d 501, 504-506 [5, 6] [247 P.2d 
561], the only reasonable conclusion consistent with the voli-
tional theory, as it is accepted and applied in this state, is that 
the claimants were out of work after the lockout because of 
their own conduct and that of their authorized unions. 
Petitioners urge that we overrule the volitional test, at 
least as applied in McKinley, or else undertake to distinguish 
the present case in order to permit payment of benefits. We 
recognize that the McKinley decision was by a divided court. 
The majority (four of the justices) concurred in analyzing 
the Bunny's Waffle Shop decision as follows (34 Ca1.2d 239, 
243-244): "[C]ertain restaurant owners sought to compel 
SSee footnote 1, supra, p. 24. 
• According to the decision of tbe appeals board, "As a result of • • • 
notice and discussion" bad with the association's members and commit· 
tees, the union was aware that a lookout could result in ease of a strike; 
but it did not believe that such result would follow. Tbe executive board 
viewed the notiee of tbe assooiation as a threat which migbt be tried but 
which would be ineffeetive. • • . In our opinion, the facts are such as to 
render all of the claimants exeept [an employe of a restaurant not a 
member of the assooia.tion] •.. ineligible for benefits within the rule 
of McKi",Ull v. CalifCYmw Employment Stabilwation. Commission (1949), 
84 Cal.2d 289 [209 P.2d 602)." 
() 
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their employees, through their union, to deal with a newly 
organized San Francisco Employers' Council in obtaining a 
eollective bargaining agreement. The union refused to bar-
gain except with the individual employers as had been the 
custom. To compel joint negotiations, the restaurant owners 
made a reduction of 25 per cent in wages, and a six-day week 
with split shifts was established instead of the existing five-day 
week and straight shift. When the employees were paid at 
the lower rate, they left their jobs. . . . 
"The commission contended that, in effect, the employers' 
action constituted a lockout. This position was upheld be-
cause the court determined, after reviewing the employers' 
acts, that they were disassociated from any bona fide proposal 
in connection with the dispute, hence, • when claimants left 
their work, they left because of this economic weapon and not 
because of the trade dispute then in existence.' In reaching 
its conclusion, the court recognized that, in reality, the form 
of the cessation of employment is not controlling and the de-
terminative factor is the volitional cause of the work stoppage. 
In other words, although the employees left work of their own 
choice, that choice was not freely made but was compelled 
by the economic weapon which the employers used. This is 
the only sound and fair way to apply the subjective volitional 
test stated in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 
17 Ca1.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935J. 
II Applying this rule to the issue in the present case, the 
stipUlated facts clearly show that the employees of the Sacra-
mento bakeries left their work voluntarily and, therefore, 
should have been excluded from receiving unemployment 
benefits. Continuously since 1935, the union and the associa-
tion, by collective bargaining, had entered into one master 
contract which included all of the employers and the em-
ployees of the baking industry of Sacramento. It seems clear 
that under such industry-wide, single contract negotiation, 
economic action by either side, whether strike or lockout, 
would be considered by each of the parties as action against 
the entire group struck or locked out. However, for the pur-
pose of furthering the demand for certain amendments to 
that contract, the members of the union, by group action, 
voted to strike. The selection of a certain plant or plants 
for a shutdown by strike at a particular time was a mere 
matter of strategy in the conduct of the trade dispute which 
equally involved all of the bakeries and their employees. 
This, in effect, applied the union's economic sanctions against 
() 
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each employer and brought about the unemployment of all of 
its members. Had the association acted first by closing down 
one of the member plants and the union followed with a strike 
against all of the remaining plants, it would be equally clear 
that the volitional act causing unemployment was the initial 
shutdown. " 
,\Ve recognize also that in McKinley three justices dissented 
(pp. 252-263 of 34 Ca1.2d), being of the view that the voli-
tional test was not properly applicable in the circumstances 
of that case. We emphasize, however, that the division of 
opinion was not on the basic rule of law itself but was solely 
as to its applicability as a matter of law to the facts there 
presented. The majority determined that "the only sound 
and fair way to apply the subjective volitional test stated in 
Bodinson" (pp. 243-244) was to enforce it in the circum-
stances there shown (where there was a trade dispute between 
parties to a master collective bargaining contract, each acting 
through authorized representatives) against the party who 
strikes the first blow with the drastic economic weapon of 
strike or lockout. As has hereinabove been shown, the cir-
cumstances here, for all purposes material to the rule of 
law, are substantially the same or similar to those in Mc-
Kinley. The equal applicability of the rule therefore, re-
gardless of whether the first blow be struck by employers or 
by employes, is now as .much a part of the rule as is the first 
enunciation of it in Bodinson or its development and applica-
tion in Bunny's Waffie Shop. 
It is of some significance that the Legislature has not seen 
fit to alter section 1262 since decision of the above cited cases 
although in various other respects the Unemployment Insur-
ance Code has been amended. (Cole v. Rusk (1955), 45 
Ca1.2d 345, 355 [8, 9] [289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137]; 
State v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957),48 Ca1.2d 355, 364 [7] 
[310 P.2d 1].) It also bears mention in connection with the 
question as to whether we shall depart from or adhere to our 
present rule governing construction and application of the 
volitional test that the following out of state cases have cited, 
followed, and r'elied upon McKinley, Bunny's Waffle Shop. 
or Bodinson, or upon the volitional test principles expressed 
in those cases: Depaoli v. Ernst (1957), 73 Nev. 79 [309 P.2d 
363, 365-367]; Teamsters, Ohauffeurs, etc. Brotherhood v. 
Omnge TratTIsp. Co. (1956),5 Utah 2d 45 [296 P.2d 291, 294] ; 
Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Indusi1'ial Commission (1952), 121 
Utah 525 [243 P.2d 951, 956-959J ; Lexcs v. Industrial Com-
30 GAlIDNER v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA [53 C.2d 
mission (1952), 121 Utah 551 [243 P.2d 964, 966-969] j 
Sckoenwiemer v. Board of Review (1957),44 N.J.Super. 377 
[130 A.2d 648) j Climax Fire Brick 00. v. Unemployment 
Oomp. Board of Review (1950), 166 Pa.Super. 481 [72 A.2d 
300,302] j Amory Worsted Mills v. Riley (1950),96 N.H. 162 
[71 A.2d 788, 790-791]); see also AckerZund v. Employment 
Security Department (1956),49 Wn.2d 292 [300 P.2d 1019] ; 
MO'Untain States Tel. &- Tel. 00. v. Sakrison (1950),71 Ariz. 
219 [225 P.2d 707]. 
As applied in the subject and cited cases the rule works 
impartially as to both employes and employers and puts each 
group on notice that the one which creates and first applies 
the economic weapon in a trade dispute under circumstances 
such as those present in Bunny's WafHe Shop, or McKinley 
or here, may have to bear responsibility for foreseeable re-
prisals. 
We conclude that in the interest of stability of the law 
any change of substance of the rule, or of circumstances for 
its applicability, should come from the Legislature rather than 
from reconsideration by this court. 
The judgment of the superior court is reversed except as 
to benefits ordered to be paid to petitioner Joan Northcutt, 
who was the employe of San Bemo Restaurant,l which was 
.neither an active member of the association nor an authorizing 
employer, and as to such benefits it is affirmed. 
Spence, J., McComb, J., and White, J., concurred. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred in the judgment. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-For the reasons set forth in 
the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Gibson in McKinley 
v. Oalifornia Emp. Stab. Oom., 34 Ca1.2d 239, 252 [209 P.2d 
602], it is my opinion that petitioners did not voluntarily 
leave their work because of a trade dispute. (Unempl. Ins. 
Code, § 1262.) Since a majority of the court, however, is 
unwilling to overrule the McKinley case, I concur in the 
judgment under the compulsion of that case. 
PETERS, J.-I dissent. 
The majority of this court, by judicially amending section 
1262 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, l have denied to 
·See footnote 2, npra, p. 24. 
1 FormerlJr section 56 of the Unemployment wlUance Act. 
j 
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employees who want to work and are desirous of doing so but 
who are locked out of their employment by their employers, 
the benefits of unemployment insurance conferred upon them 
by the statute. This is done by simply holding, contrary to 
the fact, and contrary to the realities of the situation, that 
employees "voluntarily" leave their work when a strike is 
called by the union against several employers, and other em-
ployers, not struck, close their plants pursuant to an agree-
ment among the employers that a "strike against one is a 
strike against all." Thus, employees who are willing to work 
and who are not on strike are prevented from collecting un-
employment insurance by a unilateral agreement between 
employers to which the employees are not parties. The em-
ployers may, of course, legally enter into such an agreement,' 
but to hold that, in such event, the employees of the non-struck 
plants left their work "voluntarily," and were not the victims 
of a "lock out" is to disregard the ordinary, plain and proper 
meaning of these two terms. It is judicial legislation of the 
most obvious type. 
This result is reached on the authority of McKinley v. 
California Emp. Stab. Com., 34 Ca1.2d 239 [209 P.2d 602). 
It is true that in that case the four justices then constituting 
a majority of this court so interpreted the statute. This in-
terpretation was just as wrong then as it is now. This was 
clearly pointed out in the dissents of Chief Justice Gibs()n 
(34 Ca1.2d at p. 252)2 and of Justice Carter (34 Ca1.2d 263). 
We are now told by the majority that, because four members 
of this court reached this result in M cK inley, we should not 
reappraise that result because to do so will interfere with 
the "certainty" of the law. "Certainty" in the law is a 
desirable concept, but it is not the only prmciple that should 
govern appellate action. I certainly agree that, once this 
court has decided an issue, even if it be by a bare majority, 
the decision thus reached should be followed in subsequent 
cases unless there are compelling reasons why it should not. 
It is undeniably true that every decision of the court should 
not be reconsidered simply because of a change of personnel 
in the court. Stare decisis is an important doctrine. But 
it is equally true that it is not the function of a Supreme 
Court justice to sit back in every case and automatically per-
petuate the errors of his predecessors simply because those 
errors were once approved. Where a prior decision is clearly 
-xn which disaeut Justice Traynor joiDed. 
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wrong, where it has done a great injustice to a large segment 
of our population, and where an important issue is at stake a 
judge should not hesitate to reevaluate, to reconsider, and, if 
necessary, to overrule prior decisions. 
This is such a case. This court adopted and properly 
applied the so-called volitional test in interpreting section 
1256 of the Insurance Code in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California 
Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 32~ [109 P.2d 935], and in Bunny', 
Waffie Shop v. California Emp. Com., 24 Ca1.2d 735 [151 P.2d 
224] . These holdings were misinterpreted and misapplied in 
the McKinley case. That misinterpretation and misapplication 
of the statute is being perpetuated by the majority opinion 
in the present case. 
The proper interpretation and application of the statute 
were clearly and correctly pointed out by Chief Justice Gibson 
and by Justice Carter in their dissents in the McKinley case. 
I can add nothing material to what is there said. I base my 
dissent on the views there expressed. Suffice it. to say that if 
the majority are correct they have placed in the hands of the 
employers the means of denying unemployment benefits to a 
large segment of labor. If the majority are correct, an over-
all employers' asociation in any particular area can simply 
adopt by unilateral action a policy that a "strike against one 
is a strike against all." Then if a strike is called against one, 
and there is a general lockout, . all labor thus locked out will 
be deprived of the benefits of a statute passed for their benefit. 
This is not what the act provides or intends. 
I would affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
10, 1959. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
